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I 
SCOPE 
he cap on noneconomic damages of ORS 31.710(1) was declared 
unconstitutional in 1999 as a violation of the right to a jury trial 
under article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution.1 Lakin, in turn, 
was overruled by Horton v. Oregon Health & Science University.2 
 
* B.S. Portland State University, 1971; J.D. Willamette University College of Law, 
1974; Law Clerk to Honorable Edward Howell, Oregon Supreme Court, 1974–1975; 
Private Practice, civil litigation and appeals, Pendleton, Oregon, 1975–present. 
1 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 
P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 250, 376 
P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
2 Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044. 
T
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With the removal of the jury trial underpinnings of Lakin, the 
constitutionality of noneconomic damages caps is again in play. 
Horton left open the question of whether damages caps—other 
than those found as part of a broader statutory plan involving 
sovereign immunity or a quid pro quo—comply with the article I, 
section 10, remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution. This Article 
discusses the constitutionality of those caps under article I, section 10. 
It concludes that caps, such as found in ORS 31.710(1), which are not 
a part of a larger substituted remedy or quid pro quo, are 
unconstitutional. 
II 
THE HORTON DECISION 
In Horton v. Oregon Health & Science University the plaintiff’s 
six-year-old son suffered catastrophic injuries during a botched 
surgery.3 Both the doctor who performed the surgery and hospital 
where the surgery was performed admitted liability. The question of 
damages was submitted to a jury. The jury returned a verdict, finding 
that the plaintiff’s son suffered over $12 million in economic and 
noneconomic damages. 
Pursuant to the damages cap in the Oregon Tort Claims Act,4 the 
trial court reduced the jury’s verdict against the hospital to $3 
million.5 However, the trial court denied the reduction as to the 
doctor, a state employee covered by the Oregon Tort Claims Act, and 
he appealed. On direct appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of the damages cap under ORS 30.265(1), which 
limited tort liability of the state and its employees to $3 million.6 
The court upheld the constitutionality of the damages cap under the 
Oregon Tort Claims Act. In so holding, it rejected the argument that 
the cap under ORS 30.265(1) violated the right to a jury trial under 
article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. To reach that 
holding, it overruled Lakin.7 
The court, limiting its holding to the Oregon Tort Claims Act, held 
that the damages cap under that statutory scheme did not violate 
 
3 Id. at 171, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
4 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(1) (2015). 
5 Horton, 359 Or. at 172, 376 P.3d at 1002. 
6 Id. at 172–73, 376 P.3d at 1002. 
7 Id. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044 (specifically overruling the holding in Lakin that a 
damages cap violates article I, section 17, the jury trial clause, of the Oregon Constitution). 
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article I, section 10—the remedy clause.8 It specifically left open the 
question of whether damages caps that are not part of a larger 
substituted remedy or quid pro quo9—such as those found in ORS 
31.710(1)—violate the constitutional guarantee of a remedy under 
article I, section 10. 
 Our holding today is limited to the circumstances that this case 
presents, and it turns on the presence of the state’s constitutionally 
recognized interest in sovereign immunity, the quid pro quo that the 
Tort Claims Act provides, and the tort claims limits in this case. We 
express no opinion on whether other types of damages caps, which 
do not implicate the state’s constitutionally recognized interest in 
sovereign immunity and which are not part of a similar quid pro 
quo, comply with Article I, section 10.10 
III 
DAMAGES CAP WHICH IS NOT A PART OF A SUBSTITUTED REMEDY 
OR QUID PRO QUO VIOLATES THE REMEDY CLAUSE 
A damages cap such as that found in ORS 31.710(1) is unqualified 
by any substituted remedy or quid pro quo—it merely reduces the 
recovery of the most seriously injured plaintiffs to an arbitrary 
number without regard to the extent of their injuries. As such, it 
violates article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. 
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, commonly known 
as the remedy clause, provides, in relevant part: “every man shall 
have a remedy by due course of law for injury done to him in his 
person, property, or reputation.”11 
The remedy clause “limits the legislature’s substantive authority to 
alter or adjust a person’s remedy for injuries to person, property, and 
reputation.”12 It “substantively ensures a remedy for persons injured 
in their person, property, or reputation.”13 
 
8 Id. at 224, 376 P.3d at 1030. 
9 “Quid pro quo” is literally “this for that.” Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 757 
P.2d 251, 259 (Kan. 1988). In evaluating a “quid pro quo” it is important to keep in mind 
what the “this” is for the “that.” Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or. 359, 400, 298 P.3d 1, 24 (2013) 
(De Muniz, J., dissenting). 
10 Horton, 359 Or. at 225, 376 P.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). 
11 OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
12 Horton, 359 Or. at 173, 376 P.3d at 1002. 
13 Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 359 Or. 610, 639 n.10, 375 P.3d 490, 506 n.10 
(2016). 
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The requirement of a quid pro quo to satisfy the remedy clause is 
found in prior case law and in well-reasoned authorities from other 
jurisdictions. 
A. Oregon Case Law 
In determining the limits the remedy clause places on the 
legislature, the court in Horton noted that the reason for the 
legislature’s action can matter. 
For example, the legislature has sought to “adjust” a person’s rights 
and remedies as part of a larger statutory scheme that extends 
benefits to some while limiting benefits to others, we have 
considered that “quid pro quo” in determining whether the reduced 
benefit that the legislature has provided an individual plaintiff is 
“substantial” in light of the overall statutory scheme.14 
Oregon courts have had limited opportunity to evaluate the caps of 
ORS 31.710(1) with regard to the remedy clause. The statute was 
fully in effect for only a limited period of time.15 It was declared 
unconstitutional as violating both the reexamination clause16 in 
199417 and the right to a jury trial in 1999.18 With one exception,19 
Oregon courts have evaluated damages caps in relation to the caps 
contained in the Oregon Tort Claims Act.20 
In each case, the court considered the existence of an adequate 
remedy—in relation to the damages cap—as a part of a larger remedy 
or quid pro quo that conferred certain benefits in exchange for the 
remedy taken away.21 In some cases the substituted remedy was 
 
14 Horton, 359 Or. at 219, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
15 ORS 31.710(1) remained in effect with regard to claims other than those which 
existed at common law in 1857. See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 
P.3d 333 (2001), overruled by Horton, 359 Or. at 188, 376 P.3d at 1010. 
16 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended 1996). 
17 See Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Or. App. 511, 529, 873 P.2d 413, 424 (1994), 
rev. dismissed, 321 Or. 561, 901 P.2d 859 (1995). 
18 See Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 67, 987 P.2d 463, 467, modified, 329 Or. 
369, 987 P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044. 
19 See Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 906 P.2d 789 (1995). 
20 See Horton, 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998; Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or. 359, 298 P.3d 1 
(2013); Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418 (2007); Hale v. Port of 
Portland, 308 Or. 508, 783 P.2d 506 (1989); Ackerman v. OHSU Med. Grp., 233 Or. App. 
511, 227 P.3d 744 (2010). 
21 See Horton, 359 Or. at 221, 376 P.3d at 1028; Howell, 353 Or. at 376, 298 P.3d at 
10; Clarke, 343 Or. at 601, 175 P.3d 429; Hale, 308 Or. at 523, 783 P.2d at 514–15; 
Ackerman, 233 Or. App. at 527, 227 P.3d at 753–54. 
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deemed adequate.22 In others, even with the quid pro quo, the 
resulting remedy was inadequate and violated article I, section 10.23 
In his dissent in Howell, Justice De Muniz took issue with the 
adequacy of the substitute remedy. However, he agreed that an 
essential requirement of a “substantial remedy” under the majority 
opinion is the presence of a quid pro quo. “[S]ome benefit must be 
conferred as a ‘quid pro quo’ in exchange for the remedy taken 
away.”24 
As noted above, the one exception is Greist v. Phillips.25 In Greist, 
the court upheld the application of the cap found in ORS 31.710, 
formerly ORS 18.560, and reduced an award of noneconomic 
damages from $1.5 million to $500,000—or one-third of the jury’s 
award.26 The court was careful to limit its holding to statutory 
wrongful death cases.27 In so holding, the court pointed out the 
special history of wrongful death actions, which had a cap that, from 
the time of inception to 1967, never exceeded $25,000.28 That unique 
history was cited in distinguishing Greist in Clarke.29 The court in 
Greist concluded that the $600,000 total remedy that plaintiff 
received under ORS 18.560 was “substantial,” emphasizing that 
statutory wrongful death actions in Oregon historically had been 
subject to low limits of recovery and that the statute contained no 
limit on economic damages.30 
In Hughes v. PeaceHealth and Storm v. McClung, the court took 
the wrongful death cases out of the remedy analysis altogether, 
holding there was no cause of action for wrongful death in 1857 (the 
 
22 See Howell, 353 Or. at 388, 298 P.3d at 17; Hale, 308 Or. at 529–30, 783 P.2d at 
518–19. 
23 Horton, 359 Or. at 224–25, 376 P.3d at 1030; Clarke, 343 Or. at 608, 175 P.3d at 
433–34; Ackerman, 233 Or. App. at 531–33, 227 P.3d at 756–57. 
24 Howell, 353 Or. at 406, 298 P.3d at 27 (De Muniz, J., dissenting). 
25 Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 906 P.2d 789 (1995). 
26 Id. at 291, 906 P.2d at 795. As noted above, application of the cap in the instant case 
reduces the noneconomic damages to just under five percent of the jury’s award. 
27 Id. at 284, 906 P.2d at 791. 
28 Id. at 291, 906 P.2d at 795 (“In relation to that history, the present remedy is 
substantial.”). 
29 Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 605, 175 P.3d 418, 431 (2007). 
30 Greist, 322 Or. at 291, 906 P.2d at 795. 
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date of the Oregon Constitution).31 Therefore, article I, section 10, 
was inapplicable.32 
With the abandonment of the 1857 “bright line” remedy clause 
protection, statutory wrongful death cases also fall within the 
protective cover of article I, section 10. 
B. Other Jurisdictions 
The court in Horton cited to Kansas cases Kansas Malpractice 
Victims Coal. v. Bell33 and Miller v. Johnson,34 noting the necessity 
of an adequate quid pro quo to satisfy the state’s remedy clause.35 
In Kansas Malpractice Victims, the court held that the Kansas 
medical malpractice legislation simply limited the plaintiff’s remedy 
with no substitute benefit.36 Without that quid pro quo, the statute 
violated the remedy clause. 
The cap and annuity provisions of HB 2661 infringe upon a medical 
malpractice victim’s constitutional right to a remedy by due course 
of law and no quid pro quo is provided in return. The trial court was 
correct in holding the caps and the annuity provisions 
unconstitutional as a violation of [s]ection 18.37 
In Miller, the court further explained a two-step analysis for 
meeting the remedy clause’s quid pro quo requirements. 
A two-step analysis is required for the quid pro quo test. For step 
one, we determine whether the modification to the common-law 
remedy or the right to jury trial is reasonably necessary in the public 
interest to promote the public welfare. This first step is similar to 
the analysis used to decide equal protection questions under the 
rational basis standard. For step two, we determine whether the 
legislature substituted an adequate statutory remedy for the 
modification to the individual right at issue. This step is more 
stringent than the first because even if a statute is consistent with 
public policy, there still must be an adequate substitute remedy 
 
31 See Hughes v. PeaceHealth, 344 Or. 142, 152, 178 P.3d 225, 231 (2008), overruled 
by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 227, 376 P.3d 998, 1032 (2016); Storm 
v. McClung, 334 Or. 210, 222, 47 P.3d 476, 482 (2002). 
32 See Hughes, 344 Or. at 152, 178 P.3d at 231. 
33 Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 264 (Kan. 1988). 
34 Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012). 
35 Horton, 359 Or. at 249 n.47, 376 P.3d at 1043 n.47. 
36 Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal., 757 P.2d at 264. 
37 Id. Several years later, the Kansas court held that a later version of the act, which did 
provide a quid pro quo substitute remedy, did not violate the remedy clause. See Bair v. 
Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1191 (Kan. 1991); see also Miller, 289 P.3d at 1118. 
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conferred on those individuals whose rights are adversely 
impacted.38 
Likewise, in Lucas v. United States, the Texas Supreme Court 
noted the requirement for some substitute remedy. 
It is significant to note that in two of the jurisdictions in which 
damages caps were upheld, the fact that alternative remedies were 
provided weighed heavily in the decisions. In Johnson v. St. Vincent 
Hospital, the court stated “[t]he [Indiana] legislature responded by 
creating the patient compensation fund.” Louisiana enacted a statute 
with a patient compensation fund identical to the Indiana statute.39 
In Smith v. Department of Ins., the Florida court held that a cap on 
noneconomic damages of $450,000 violated that state’s open courts 
guarantee because it failed to provide “a reasonable alternative 
remedy or commensurate benefit[.]”40 
C. A Quid Pro Quo Is Necessary 
Justice De Muniz correctly summarized the state of the law with 
regard to legislative action altering remedies. “[S]ome benefit must be 
conferred as a ‘quid pro quo’ in exchange for the remedy taken away  
. . . .”41 The cap of ORS 31.710 provides no quid pro quo and violates 
the right to a remedy. 
IV 
THE BENEFITS OF THE REQUIRED QUID PRO QUO MUST FLOW TO 
THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED 
When the legislature enacted the cap, the benefits identified were 
reduced insurance premiums, better rates, predictability in reinsurance 
markets, and a reduction of the cost of goods.42 As questionable as 
those goals may be, they do not satisfy the requirement that the quid 
pro quo limit benefits to some while extending them to others.43 As 
shown in Horton, Howell, Clarke, and Hale, the “others” referred to 
 
38 Miller, 289 P.3d at 1114 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
39 Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988) (first quoting Johnson v. 
St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 601 (Ind. 1980); then citing Sibley v. Bd. of 
Supervisors of La., 462 So. 2d 149, 156, modified, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985)). 
40 Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088 (Fla. 1987). 
41 Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or. 359, 406, 298 P.3d 1, 27 (2013) (De Muniz, J., dissenting). 
42 See Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 299, 906 P.2d 789, 799 (1995) (quoting the 
legislative testimony in support). 
43 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 219, 376 P.3d 998, 1027 (2016). 
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persons who would benefit from the change rather than to society 
generally.44 
In declaring the wrongful death cap in medical malpractice cases 
unconstitutional, the Florida Supreme Court accurately described “tort 
reform” caps. 
[S]ection 766.118, Florida Statutes, has the effect of saving a 
modest amount for many by imposing devastating costs on a few – 
those who are most grievously injured, those who sustain the 
greatest damage and loss, and multiple claimants for whom 
judicially determined noneconomic damages are subject to division 
and reduction simply based upon the existence of the cap.45 
In Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, the Illinois court described the cap 
“arbitrarily and automatically reduces the jury’s award for a lifetime 
of pain and disability, without regard to whether or not the verdict, 
before reduction, was reasonable and fair.”46 
In Smith v. Department of Ins., Justice Overton, in his concurring 
opinion, argued that a cap of $450,000 was justified on the basis that 
it would keep premiums down and ensure available and affordable 
insurance for everyone.47 The majority rejected that argument in 
holding the cap violated the remedy clause. 
This reasoning fails to recognize that we are dealing with a 
constitutional right which may not be restricted simply because the 
legislature deems it rational to do so. Rationality only becomes 
relevant if the legislature provides an alternative remedy or 
abrogates or restricts the right based on a showing of overpowering 
public necessity and that no alternative method of meeting that 
necessity exists. Here, however, the legislature has provided 
nothing in the way of an alternative remedy or commensurate 
benefit and one can only speculate, in an act of faith, that somehow 
the legislative scheme will benefit the tort victim.48 
In Kansas Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, the court held that the 
legislature must provide an adequate substitute remedy “for the right 
infringed or abolished.”49 The court rejected the argument that the 
 
44 Horton, 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998; Howell, 353 Or. 359, 298 P.3d 1; Clarke v. Or. 
Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418 (2007); Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 
508, 783 P.2d 506 (1989). 
45 Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 903 (Fla. 2014). Because the court 
held the cap violated equal protection, it did not reach the open courts argument. Id. at 
897. But see Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088 (holding that the cap violated the remedy clause). 
46 Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1075 (Ill. 1997). 
47 Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1089, 1096 (Overton, J., concurring). 
48 Id. at 1089. 
49 Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 263 (Kan. 1988). 
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“removal of a remedy can be justified any time by public need.”50 
This requirement was reaffirmed in Miller v. Johnson, where the court 
held that a substitute remedy must be “conferred on those individuals 
whose rights are adversely impacted.”51 
Even if the benefit to the public was considered a permissible 
justification, several courts and scholars have pointed out that those 
benefits, as a part of “tort reform”—are illusory. In Estate of McCall 
v. United States, the court questioned whether a legitimate 
relationship existed between the cap on noneconomic wrongful death 
damages and the lowering of medical malpractice insurance 
premiums.52 The court said, 
even if there had been a medical malpractice crisis in Florida at the 
turn of the century, the current data reflects that it has subsided.  No 
rational basis currently exists (if it ever existed) between the cap 
imposed by section 766.118 and any legitimate state purpose. At the 
present time, the cap on noneconomic damages serves no purpose 
other than to arbitrarily punish the most grievously injured or their 
surviving family members.53 
In North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan, the court declared 
the cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases 
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection.54 The court noted 
that there was no evidence of a continuing medical malpractice 
insurance crisis. 
We conclude that the caps on noneconomic damages in sections 
766.118(2) and (3) arbitrarily reduce damage awards for plaintiffs 
who suffer the most drastic injuries. We further conclude that 
because there is no evidence of a continuing medical malpractice 
insurance crisis justifying the arbitrary and invidious discrimination 
between medical malpractice victims, there is no rational 
relationship between the personal injury noneconomic damage caps 
in section 766.118 and alleviating this purported crisis. Therefore, 
we hold that the caps on personal injury noneconomic damages 
provided in section 766.118 violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Florida Constitution.55 
 
50 Id.; see also Shannon M. Roesler, Comment, The Kansas Remedy by Due Course of 
Law Provision: Defining a Right to a Remedy, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 655, 679 (1999). 
51 Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1114 (Kan. 2012). 
52 Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914–15 (Fla. 2014). 
53 Id. (citation omitted). 
54 N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 59 (Fla. 2017). 
55 Id. 
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Likewise, it is clear from two Wisconsin court opinions, Mayo v. 
Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund56 and 
Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,57 that in a current 
and previous caps statute, there is no relationship between caps and 
insurance premiums, doctor retention, or the practice of defensive 
medicine.58 
Evaluating the application of caps under an equal protection 
analysis, in Arneson v. Olson, the North Dakota Supreme Court found 
there was no insurance crisis supporting a $300,000 cap in 
malpractice cases.59 The court went further to note that any possible 
lowered insurance premiums and medical care costs do not form a 
legitimate quid pro quo. “This Quid pro quo does not extend to the 
seriously injured medical malpractice victim and does not serve to 
bring the limited recovery provision within the rationale of the cases 
upholding the constitutionality of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act.”60 
In Lucas v. United States, the Texas Supreme Court answered a 
certified question from the federal court, holding that the cap on 
medical malpractice awards of $500,000 was unconstitutional based 
on a violation of the remedy clause.61 The court rejected the proffered 
justification based on insurance rates. “In the context of persons 
catastrophically injured by medical negligence, we believe it is 
unreasonable and arbitrary to limit their recovery in a speculative 
experiment to determine whether liability insurance rates will 
decrease.”62 
The cap in ORS 31.710 (previously ORS 18.560) was declared 
unconstitutional in 1994 in Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., on the 
grounds that it violated the reexamination clause of article VII 
(amended), section 3 of the Oregon Constitution.63 The statute’s 
 
56 Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 901 N.W.2d 782, 791–92 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2017). 
57 Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 485–89 (Wis. 2005). 
58 For an exhaustive review of scholarly literature showing the lack of connection 
between caps and the supposed benefits of “tort reform” such as the availability of 
insurance, lower premiums and doctor retention, see the dissenting opinion of Chief 
Justice Durham, listing research sources in appendices A and B in Judd v. Drezga, 103 
P.3d 135, 152–53 (Utah 2004) (Durham, C.J., dissenting). 
59 Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978). 
60 Id. (quoting Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976)). 
61 Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988). 
62 Id. 
63 Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Or. App. 511, 529, 873 P.2d 413, 424 (1994), rev. 
dismissed, 321 Or. 561, 901 P.2d 859 (1995). 
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unconstitutionality was affirmed on the alternative ground that, as 
held by the court in Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., the statute violated 
the jury trial clause of article I, section 17.64 There is no showing that 
the “parade of horribles,” which was predicted to occur if caps were 
not enacted, came to pass in the decades that the caps statute was not 
applied. 
Under ORS 31.170, unlike the worker’s compensation system, no-
fault auto insurance or the Oregon Tort Claims Act, there is no 
substituted remedy which extends benefits to the parties affected.65 
Without such a remedy, the statute fails. 
To permit the legislature to simply abolish an established remedy, 
in “some spasm of novel opinion,”66 would render the remedy clause 
meaningless and subject remedies to change or elimination based on 
the legislature’s unfettered determination of public good. 
V 
THE SUBSTITUTED REMEDY MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL 
A. Statutes with No Quid Pro Quo 
As noted above, without an accompanying substitute remedy or 
quid pro quo, a cap on damages is not an adequate remedy satisfying 
article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. This is true 
regardless of the amount of the cap. 
In Smith v. Department of Ins., the court held that a cap of 
$450,000, without a substituted remedy, violated the constitutional 
right to access to the courts without regard to the amount of the 
damages cap. 
Access to courts is granted for the purpose of redressing injuries. A 
plaintiff who receives a jury verdict for, e.g., $1,000,000, has not 
received a constitutional redress of injuries if the legislature 
statutorily, and arbitrarily, caps the recovery at $450,000. Nor, we 
add, because the jury verdict is being arbitrarily capped, is the 
 
64 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 
P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 250, 376 
P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
65 Evanhoff v. State Indus. Accident Comm’n, 78 Or. 503, 523, 154 P. 106, 113 (1915) 
(holding that the worker’s compensation system did not violate article I, section 10, of the 
Oregon Constitution). 
66 Eastman v. Clackamas, 32 F. 24, 32 (D. Or. 1887) (Judge Matthew Deady, former 
president of the Oregon Constitutional Convention, stated, “If [a] then known and 
accustomed remedy can be taken away in the face of this constitutional provision, what 
other may not? Can the legislature, in some spasm of novel opinion, take away every 
man’s remedy for slander, assault and battery, or the recovery of a debt?”). 
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plaintiff receiving the constitutional benefit of a jury trial as we 
have heretofore understood that right. Further, if the legislature may 
constitutionally cap recovery at $450,000, there is no discernible 
reason why it could not cap the recovery at some other figure, 
perhaps $50,000, or $1,000, or even $1.67 
Likewise, in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt—
dealing with the right to jury trial—the court noted the fact that the 
cap constituted a “significant amount” cannot save the statute from a 
constitutional attack.68 
B. Statutes Providing a Quid Pro Quo 
For cases involving a substitute remedy, the court has mandated 
that the constitutional adequacy of the remedy be judged not merely 
by the dollar amount involved, but also by taking into account “other 
factors, such as the existence of a quid pro quo.”69 Unfortunately, 
except through ad hoc comparisons, the court does not give guidance 
on how to measure those “other factors” to determine if the remaining 
remedy is inadequate. 
We know that a cap of $200,000 for damages exceeding $17 
million constitutes a “paltry fraction”70 and violates the remedy 
clause.71 Moreover, we know that a cap of $3 million for damages 
exceeding $12 million does not violate the remedy clause.72 
What is missing from the majority opinion is any discussion of the 
restorative nature of the substituted remedy. In her dissent, Justice 
Walters points out that the remedy provided must be substantially 
restorative to satisfy the requirements of article I, section 10.73 This 
restorative requirement was applied in Clarke.74 
This restorative requirement of the substituted remedy was further 
recognized by the court in both Colby v. City of Portland, holding that 
 
67 Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088–89 (Fla. 1987). 
68 Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010). 
69 Horton, 359 Or. at 221, 376 P.3d at 1028. 
70 Id. (“[T]he legislative remedy need not restore all the damages that the plaintiff 
sustained to pass constitutional muster, but a remedy that is only a paltry fraction of the 
damages that the plaintiff sustained will unlikely be sufficient.”) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
71 Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418 (2007). 
72 Horton, 359 Or. at 225, 376 P.3d at 1030. The Horton court pointed out that, in 
Clarke, the court failed to take into consideration the additional interests addressed by the 
Tort Claims Act. However, the court expressed its agreement with the result in Clarke. Id. 
at 224 n.28, 376 P.3d at 1030 n.28. 
73 Id. at 288, 295, 376 P.3d at 1065, 1069 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
74 Clarke, 343 Or. at 606, 175 P.3d at 432. 
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an adequate remedy must be a complete remedy, rather than a partial 
and doubtful remedy,75 and Caviness v. City of Vale, which described 
a constitutionally adequate remedy as being one that will “provide an 
equivalent remedy; one reasonably adequate to serve the purpose of 
the one taken away.”76 
More recently, in Ackerman v. OHSU Medical Group, the Oregon 
Court of Appeals held that capping the plaintiff’s damages of roughly 
$1.4 million at $400,000 violates article I, section 10, because 
“[n]either the ratio of the capped remedy to the jury-determined 
remedy, nor the raw numerical difference between them, can be said 
to ‘restor[e] the right that has been injured.’”77 
Hopefully, in cases following Horton, courts will give more 
attention to the restorative nature of the substituted remedy because 
the ad hoc comparison method is inadequate. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages has gone through 
decades of judicially imposed slumber. Passed in 1987, the cap was 
first declared unconstitutional in 199478 and again in 1999.79 During 
that time, case law and articles showed the justifications used to 
support the cap were largely illusory. 
With one hand, Horton removed the constitutional underpinnings 
of the prior holdings that declared ORS 31.710 unconstitutional. With 
the other, Horton invited inquiry as to whether ORS 31.710 violates 
the remedy clause of article I, section 10—specifically with respect to 
the lack of a quid pro quo. 
 
75 Colby v. City of Portland, 85 Or. 359, 374, 166 P. 537, 542 (1917). 
76 Caviness v. City of Vale, 86 Or. 554, 562–63, 169 P. 95, 98 (1917). 
77 Ackerman v. OHSU Med. Grp., 233 Or. App. 511, 533, 227 P.3d 744, 757 (2010) 
(quoting Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 120, 23 P.3d 333 (2001), 
overruled by Horton, 359 Or. at 188, 376 P.3d at 1010.). Although Ackerman is a court of 
appeals decision, the author, Judge David Schuman, is an authority on the remedy clause. 
See David Schuman, Oregon’s Remedy Guarantee: Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon 
Constitution, 65 OR. L. REV. 35, 36 (1986); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 
TEMPLE L. REV. 1197, 1201–02 (1992). 
78 Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Or. App. 511, 524–25, 873 P.2d 413, 421 (1994), 
rev. dismissed, 321 Or. 561, 901 P.2d 859 (1995). 
79 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 
P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 250, 376 
P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
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A damages cap, such as that outlined in ORS 31.710, merely sets 
artificial limits on recovery. A damages cap is not a part of quid pro 
quo or substituted remedies that provide benefits to the affected 
group, ultimately violating the remedy clause.80 
 
 
80 After the submission of this article, the Oregon Court of Appeals issued opinions in 
Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 288 Or. App. 503, 406 P.3d 205 (2017) and Rains v. 
Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 289 Or. App. 672, —P.3d— (2018), on remand, 359 Or. 610, 
375 P.3d 490 (2016). In each case the court used an “as applied” analysis and held that 
ORS 31.710(1) was in violation of the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution. 
